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1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
2. See infra Part I.C. 
3. See AM. BAR ASS’N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/deathpenalty
guidelines2003.pdf.
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Introduction
Under Ake v. Oklahoma,1 indigent capital defendants are entitled to a wide
array of expert assistance at both the conviction and sentencing phases of trial.
Historically, the Ake entitlement has been under-utilized for both structural and
normative reasons.2  However, today Ake is in the process of being revitalized.
Recent Supreme Court decisions and the revised American Bar Association
(ABA) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases offer the hope that the theoretical entitlement of Ake
will be fully realized.3  Moreover, if that occurs, one of two outcomes is likely
to ensue at the state level: 1) capital defendants will receive a fully-litigated,
fair trial consistent with the principles set forth by the Supreme Court and the
ABA; and/or 2) some states will be unable to bear the financial burden of a
fully-implemented Ake, and they will either reduce the number of capital cases
pursued or they will cease pursuit of the death penalty altogether.  This article
contends that both outcomes are desirable whether or not one supports the use
of capital punishment.
This article proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes both the Ake
entitlement in theory and explanations for its historical under-utilization.  Part
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  
6. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
7. As part of his thorough overview of the Ake entitlement in an increasingly scientific
age, Professor Giannelli discusses the legal landscape prior to the Ake decision.  See Paul C.
Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA
World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1343-60 (2004); see also Lee Richard Goebes, The Equality
Principle Revisited: The Relationship of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to Ake v.
Oklahoma, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 4-10 (2002).
8. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 71 (1985).  
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
II offers evidence that Ake is in the process of being revitalized.  Specifically,
the decisions in Atkins v. Virginia,4 Wiggins v. Smith,5 and Panetti v.
Quarterman6 suggest that the Constitution requires significant Ake funding in
all capital cases.  Part III examines the impact that this trend will likely have
on the behavior of capital-sentencing states.  It is argued that these states will
have no choice but either to provide the full array of expert assistance
guaranteed by Ake and recent Supreme Court decisions or to reduce the
incidence of capital prosecution.  This article maintains that both outcomes are
laudable whether or not one believes that states should employ the death
penalty.  By way of conclusion, two related issues are addressed: 1) whether
the goal of a more fully-implemented Ake is attainable and 2) which groups
within the criminal defense community may capitalize upon the revitalization
of Ake notwithstanding broader structural and normative impediments.
I. The Historical Ake Entitlement
A. Ake v. Oklahoma7
In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was charged with murdering Mr. and Mrs.
Richard Douglas and wounding their two young children — a crime that
occurred while Mr. Ake and his accomplice were robbing the Douglas family.
At Mr. Ake’s arraignment in the District Court for Canadian County,
Oklahoma, his behavior “was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte,
ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist” to determine whether Mr. Ake
required “‘an extended period of mental observation.’”8  The initial psychiatric
report on Mr. Ake concluded that “[a]t times [Mr.] Ake appears to be frankly
delusional . . . .  He claims to be the ‘sword of vengeance’ of the Lord and that
he will sit at the left hand of God in heaven.”9  On the basis of this evaluation,
the psychiatrist declared Mr. Ake “a probable paranoid schizophrenic.”10  Mr.
Ake was then committed to a state hospital for the purpose of determining
whether or not he was competent to stand trial.  Six weeks into this
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/2
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11. Id. 
12. Id. at 71-72. 
13. Id. at 72.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 72-73.
16. Id. at 73. 
17. Ake v. Oklahoma, 1983 OK CR 48, ¶ 21, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (“We have held numerous times
that, the unique nature of capital cases notwithstanding, the State does not have the
responsibility of providing [a court-appointed psychiatrist] to indigents charged with capital
crimes.”).
commitment, the chief forensic psychiatrist at the state hospital determined
that Mr. Ake was not.11  A competency hearing confirmed this assessment, and
the court ordered him to return to the state hospital.  During his stay at the state
hospital, Mr. Ake received Thorazine, an anti-psychotic drug, on a daily basis.
Six weeks into this regimen, the same psychiatrist, who previously declared
him incompetent, informed the court that Mr. Ake was now competent and
would remain so if he continued on the same drug regimen.12
The State moved forward with its case against Mr. Ake, and at a pre-trial
conference, Mr. Ake’s counsel informed the court that his client would raise
an insanity defense.  Defense counsel argued that during Mr. Ake’s stay at the
state hospital there had been no inquiry into his sanity at the time of the
offense, and that under the federal Constitution, as an indigent, Mr. Ake was
entitled to either a psychiatric examination or the funds to obtain such an
evaluation.13  
The trial judge rejected this argument, and Mr. Ake was tried for two counts
of murder in the first degree.  During the trial’s guilt phase, Mr. Ake’s “sole
defense was insanity.”14  The jury was instructed that “[Mr.] Ake could be
found not guilty by reason of insanity if he did not have the ability to
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense” and that Mr.
Ake “was to be presumed sane at the time of the crime unless he presented
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his sanity at that time.”15
Because there was no evidence to present on the issue of Mr. Ake’s sanity at
the time of the offense and because of these jury instructions, the jury, not
surprisingly, found Mr. Ake guilty on two counts of murder in the first
degree — death-eligible crimes in the State of Oklahoma.  No new evidence
was presented at the sentencing phase of the trial, and the jury sentenced Mr.
Ake to death.16
After a failed appeal before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,17 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether the Constitution
requires a State to provide psychiatric assistance to an indigent defendant
where that defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the
time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial.  Writing for the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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18. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74.
19. Id. at 76-77 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956)). 
20. Id. at 74.  Technically, the Ake Court’s decision was grounded in the analytical
framework of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that Due Process does
not require the government to provide a hearing before terminating Social Security disability
funds).  Although Giannelli points out that because Eldridge no longer pertains in the criminal
context, Ake has been doctrinally “orphan[ed],” the Ake Court’s opinion is still on solid Due
Process footing.  See Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1364-65.  
21. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79.  
22. Id. at 80.  
23. Id. at 83. 
24. Id.
25. Id. 
majority, Justice Marshall reversed the opinion of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals and answered this question in the affirmative.18
Citing the line of cases that had established the right to “meaningful access
to justice” for a criminal defendant,19 the Court held that “when a defendant
has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is
likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State
provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant
cannot otherwise afford one.”20  Moreover, the Court rejected the State of
Oklahoma’s contention that to provide the type of psychiatric assistance that
Mr. Ake had requested would be a “staggering” financial burden.  Not only
were many other states and the federal government already providing such
services to indigent criminal defendants, but the Court also noted that the
“State’s interest in prevailing at trial . . . is necessarily tempered by its interest
in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases.”21  Additionally, the
Court took note of the prominent role that psychiatric assistance had come to
play in criminal cases nationally: “the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be
crucial to the defendant’s ability to marshal his defense.”22  In sum, the Court
held that when a defendant makes a preliminary showing that his sanity will
be a significant factor at trial, the “State’s interest in its fisc must yield” to the
greater interest in a fair trial.23
But the Ake Court did not write a blank check for indigent criminal
defendants like Mr. Ake.  The Court was careful to cabin its decision in two
significant ways.  First, the Ake Court noted that the indigent defendant does
not have a “constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking
or to receive funds to hire his own.”24  And second, the Court drew the
minimum picture of what defendants like Mr. Ake must receive: “access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist
in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.”25  As to how this
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/2
2007] THE REVITALIZATION OF AKE 287
26. For example, the Court did not explicitly say whether Ake applied outside the capital
context.  Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the Ake opinion, declared that “[n]othing in the
Court’s opinion reaches noncapital cases.”  Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  But
Justice Rehnquist did not agree and chastised the Court for the breadth of its holding: 
I do not think that the facts of this case warrant the establishment of such a
principle; and I think that even if the factual predicate of the Court’s statement
were established, the constitutional rule announced by the Court is far too broad.
I would limit the rule to capital cases . . . .
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. Ake v. State, 1989 OK CR 30, ¶ 18 n.1, 778 P.2d 460, 464 n.1 (emphasis added). 
28. Id.  
29. Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1367-68 (footnotes omitted).  
30. State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Tenn. 1995) (“[O]nly one jurisdiction has
concluded that Ake does not apply outside the capital case context” (citing Marlow v. State, 538
So. 2d 804, 807 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988))). 
31. See Fisher v. City of Eupora, 587 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1991) (assessing, but ultimately
rejecting, defendant’s need for an expert to challenge accuracy of the State’s intoxilyzer
evidence in a DUI case); State v. Turco, 576 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. App. 1998) (same); Elmore v.
State, 968 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App. 1998) (same); see also Brown v. District of Columbia, 727
A.2d 865 (D.C. 1999) (holding mother prosecuted for keeping her child out of school for nearly
two and a half years was entitled to expert fees to determine whether or not the child had
“school-phobia”); People v. Lowery, No. 04/1665, 2005 WL 1355145 (N.Y. City Ct. June 6,
right would be implemented and exactly what the contours of this right would
be, the Court left these issues to the states.26
B. Ake’s Progeny
Since 1985, states have expanded the core holding of Ake through both
judicial decisions and legislation.  First, courts have read the Ake opinion to
require similar funding for many forms of non-psychiatric expert assistance.
For example, when considering Mr. Ake’s case on remand, the state of
Oklahoma recognized the following: “the ruling in Ake must necessarily be
extended to include any expert [that] is ‘necessary for an adequate defense.’”27
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals based this decision on the fact that,
at the time, such a holding was “consistent with the view held in at least forty
other states” and with that of the federal government.28  More recently,
Giannelli has noted that “cases have recognized a right to [Ake] assistance
outside of the insanity defense, extending Ake to toxicologists, pathologists,
fingerprint experts, hypnotists, DNA analysts, serologists, ballistics experts,
handwriting examiners, blood spatter specialists, forensic dentists for bite-
mark comparisons, psychologists on the battered wife syndrome, as well as
other types of experts.”29  
Second, every state except Alabama has acknowledged that Ake applies
outside the capital context,30 and some states have considered Ake funding in
misdemeanor cases.31  Theoretically, pursuant to Ake and its progeny, counsel
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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2005) (discussing, but ultimately denying, Ake funds for determination by forensic scientist of
whether or not cocaine residue existed in a glass pipe in drug possession case). 
32. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, Guideline 4.1, at 30-31 (“[M]ental health experts
are essential to defending capital cases.  Neurological and psychiatric impairment, combined
with a history of physical and sexual abuse, are common among persons convicted of violent
offenses.  Evidence concerning the defendant’s mental status is relevant to numerous issues that
arise at various junctures during the proceedings, including competency to stand trial, sanity at
the time of the offense, capacity to intend or premeditate death, ability to comprehend Miranda
warnings, and competency to waive constitutional rights.” (footnote omitted)); see also id.,
Guideline 10.4.  
33. Id., Guideline 4.1, at 31 (“Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate
brain scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health
specialists may also be necessary.” (footnote omitted)).  For a general discussion of the role of
a neuropsychologist in the trial context, see Theodore I. Lidsky et al., The Neuropsychologist
in Brain Injury Cases, TRIAL, July 1998, at 70.  
34. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
35. It should be noted that DNA evidence is not always a critical element to a capital
defense case because other non-scientifically verifiable issues may prevail.  See John B.
Wefing, Wishful Thinking by Ronald J. Tabak: Why DNA Evidence Will Not Lead to the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 33 CONN. L. REV. 861, 878-84 (2001) (discussing difficulty of
mistaken identity in death penalty cases).  For a general discussion of the relationship between
DNA and the death penalty, see James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What’s
DNA Got to Do With It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2002). 
36. What is “necessary” will vary from case to case, as evidenced by the trial of Timothy
McVeigh.  His defense cost “somewhere between $10 and $15 million,” but the government
spent $82.6 million prosecuting the case.  Stephen Jones & Jennifer Gideon, United States v.
McVeigh: Defending the “Most-Hated Man in America”, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 617, 623 (1998).
37. Inadequate access to expert assistance stems from the larger problems of resource
disparity between the prosecution and the defense, and the chronic under-funding of indigent
defense.  For a general discussion of these issues, see Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1046-1103
(2006); Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent
Defendants and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 372-87 (2004); Douglas W. Vick,
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995).  For specific evidence of resource disparity with respect to expert
services, see Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1311-13. 
for an indigent defendant could ask for several experts in a capital case: a
psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate the defendant’s mental health,32 a
neuropsychologist to perform diagnostic testing,33 a mitigation specialist or
social worker to develop mitigation evidence relevant for the sentencing phase
of the trial,34 a DNA expert if the defendant’s identity was at issue,35 and any
other expert necessary to mount an adequate defense to the state’s case.36
C. The Historical Under-Utilization of Ake
Despite this expansion of the theoretical Ake entitlement, practically
speaking the right to Ake funds has been chronically under-utilized.37  In a
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/2
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38. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 19 (2004)
[hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.  
39. Id.  This same report also includes witness testimony regarding a death penalty case in
Georgia in which the lawyers did not make a single objection, filed only three boilerplate
motions, and failed to put on any mitigation evidence despite the fact that there was ample
mitigation evidence to offer.  Id.
40. For a general discussion of the ambiguities in the Ake doctrine and how these
ambiguities “limit its utility,” see Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent
Defendant’s ‘Right’ to an Expert Witness: A Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 401, 420-36 (2002) (noting the lack of uniformity in federal and state courts’
interpretations of Ake requirements); see also Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1365-75, 1380-82
(identifying lower courts’ attempts to define the scope of the right, and the applicable standard
for a court’s evaluation of an Ake request for funding).  
41. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83; see also id. at 83 (“We therefore hold that when
a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a
significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense.” (emphasis added)).  
2004 report, the ABA found that “indigent defense attorneys fail to fully
conduct investigations, prepare their cases, or advocate vigorously for their
clients at trial and sentencing.”38  More specifically, with respect to Ake
funding, the report included one particularly compelling finding: in a survey
of nearly 2,000 felony cases in four Alabama judicial circuits, “no motions
were filed for funds for experts or investigators in 99.4% of the cases.”39
There are at least three possible explanations for the gap between Ake in theory
and Ake in practice.  First, part of the answer can be attributed to the fact that
courts vary widely in their interpretation of the Ake mandate.  Second, the
theoretical mandate of Ake is under-utilized in some states because of the
structure of the capital defense system.  And finally, lawyering norms in some
communities discourage lawyers from seeking the Ake funds to which their
clients are entitled.
1. Varying Judicial Readings of Ake
Courts vary widely in their interpretation of the Ake mandate.40  Two
examples are illustrative.  First, courts diverge on the question whether the
request for Ake funds requires an ex parte proceeding.  The text of the Ake
opinion itself suggests that the Court contemplated an ex parte proceeding:
“When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial
court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need
for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.”41  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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42. See Justin B. Shane, Note, Money Talks: An Indigent Defendant’s Right to an Ex Parte
Hearing for Expert Funding, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 347, 355-60 (2005) (comparing the laws of
Virginia, South Dakota, Idaho, and Arizona, under which defendants must argue their case for
expert funds before the prosecution, with the laws of the federal government and several other
states, as well as the recommendations of the ABA, all of which recognize that “courts should
permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert funding”); see also Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325,
340-42 (Md. 2005) (discussing the split among courts on the ex parte issue and identifying
sixteen states that have required an ex parte hearing either by judicial or legislative decision).
43. Shane, supra note 42, at 348.  
44. Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1380-82. 
45. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74; see also id. at 82-83 (describing the same standard as whether “his
sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense”).
46. See Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1227 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (reading 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) to require a
similar two-prong standard); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining
the Eleventh Circuit’s two-prong standard); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“[A] defendant must show the trial court that there exists a reasonable probability both that an
expert would be of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert assistance would result
in a fundamentally unfair trial.”); Beckworth v. State, 946 So. 2d 490, 503 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005) (adopting the two-prong approach); State v. Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213, 1216 (La. 1994)
(same); State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 943 (Ohio 1998) (same).  
And yet, for practitioners, this is not the uniform experience.  In at least four
states, defense counsel must seek Ake funding in an adversarial setting,
whereas the federal government and other states recognize that an Ake funding
request should be ex parte.42  This distinction is crucial.  If defense counsel is
forced to litigate the defendant’s request for expert assistance, the defendant’s
case is hampered in at least two ways: (1) defense counsel may be compelled
to prematurely disclose defense theories that are being explored and (2) in
doing so, counsel may “provide non-reciprocal accelerated discovery to the
prosecution.”43  Thus, the question whether Ake requires an ex parte request is
critical, and it is one on which courts are split.
Second, courts disagree on the precise standard a defendant must meet in
order to obtain Ake funds.44  The Ake Court contemplated a one-pronged
standard: the defendant was required to show that “his sanity at the time of the
offense [was] likely to be a significant factor at trial . . . .”45  However, courts
deviate from this initial formulation of the standard in both form and
substance.  For example, some courts follow a two-pronged approach that
requires defense counsel to “demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
requested expert would aid in the defendant’s defense and that the denial of
expert assistance would result in an unfair trial.”46  This approach on its face
is more onerous than the Ake Court’s formulation because it requires the
defendant to show not simply that his need for expert assistance relates to a
significant factor in his defense, but also that without the assistance he cannot
receive a fair trial.  Giannelli points out several specific reasons why this two-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/2
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47. Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1381-82.
48. Esquilin v. Walker, No. CV-91-4608, 1992 WL 151903, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 1992)
(“Ake does not require the appointment of an expert when the court has not been provided with
a sufficient, believable factual showing in support of the defense’s nonfrivolous need for the
expert.”).
49. It is noteworthy that the ABA Guidelines make the point twice that a mitigation
specialist is an essential component of the capital defense team.  ABA GUIDELINES, supra note
3, Guidelines 4.1(A)(1) & 10.4(C)(2)(a).
50. Giannelli addresses this same catch-22 dynamic when evaluating where to draw the line
between experts “on demand” and cases where a court is essentially requiring the defendant to
“possess already the expertise of the witness sought.” Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1375.
51. People v. Brand, 787 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that at the
time of defendant’s murder trial this pre-determined dollar amount was $300 and that the
legislature had increased the amount to $1000 before a defendant is required to show
“extraordinary circumstances”).
pronged standard is more burdensome on the defendant: (1) in some instances
it may require a defendant to link himself to the crime; (2) because discovery
provided to the defense is generally inadequate, the second prong will be hard
for defense counsel to meet; and 3) “[t]he two-pronged approach also affects
the harmless error analysis in a way that disadvantages the accused.”47  Thus,
whether a defendant must meet a one- or two-pronged standard to receive Ake
funds is another significant issue on which courts diverge, and in jurisdictions
employing the two-pronged approach the original mandate of Ake is
undermined.
Finally, some courts have articulated additional criteria that a defendant
must meet in order to receive Ake funding.  For example, some courts require
a defendant to provide a sufficient factual showing that he needs the expert
assistance.48  In the case of a mitigation specialist, an expert that the ABA
Guidelines require in every capital case,49 this factual showing requirement
may present a catch-22 for defense counsel.  Courts are asking counsel to put
on the very type of evidence that the mitigation expert would generate if
retained with Ake funds.50  Moreover, at least one court has expressly stated
that where the requested funds exceed a pre-determined dollar amount, the
defendant must demonstrate to the court “extraordinary circumstances” that
justify the Ake funding request.51  Not only is such a requirement inconsistent
with the Ake opinion itself, which expressly rejected the State’s primary
concern with financial constraint, but also the dollar amount in this particular
case is so low that it may require a showing of “extraordinary circumstances”
for virtually every requested expert.  Thus, some courts have added new
requirements to the process for requesting Ake funds — requirements that may
preclude such funds in precisely the cases where the Ake Court deemed the
funds necessary.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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52. Many thanks to Eric Freedman, Maurice A. Dean Distinguished Professor of
Constitutional Law, Hofstra University School of Law, for allowing me access to the e-mail
listserv that he maintains for capital trial lawyers.
53. E-mail from Kari Converse, Attorney, to Cara H. Drinan, Assistant Professor of Law,
the Catholic University of America (Sept. 27, 2006, 21:28 EST) (on file with author). 
54. Id.
55. E-mail from Cathy Hammarsten, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma County Public
Defender, to Cara H. Drinan, Assistant Professor of Law, the Catholic University of America
(Sept. 28, 2006, 14:30 EST) (on file with author). 
56. Id.
57. Id.  As Ms. Hammarsten correctly indicated in her email, in theory, all requests for Ake
funding are submitted to the public defender’s office, and only when the head of the office
denies a request must the public defender request funds for expert assistance from the court.
See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.4 (2001).  This anecdotal evidence suggests that even those
jurisdictions that have removed the Ake funding request process from the courtroom by design
may need to inquire as to whether its entitlements are being honored. 
58. See Bailey, supra note 40, at 413-20 (discussing the Court’s repeated denial of
Anecdotal evidence from the capital defense community confirms what the
case law reveals — that states vary to a great extent in how they implement
Ake.52  One New Mexico capital defender mentioned that she makes all of her
Ake requests to the public defender’s office, and that neither the judge nor the
D.A. is involved in the process.53  This is consistent with the language of Ake.
She commented that she “would be amazed if in some jurisdiction a prosecutor
got to learn of defense strategy via expert requests and justifications, much less
have any say in whether the same were granted.”54  In stark contrast, one
Oklahoma capital defender noted that, while she usually requests expert fees
from her supervisor in the Public Defender’s office, when she sought court
funds for a trip outside of the country to develop her mitigation case,55 the
process was adversarial.  She needed to travel to Cuba to gather historical and
family records — a standard mitigation specialist tool — and before granting
any money toward that end, the court required her to litigate the issue, as she
said, “despite established law.”56  According to the judge, the court was not
“going to spend money from the public coffers and hide it from the light of
day.”57
Thus, courts diverge in their reading of the Ake mandate, and this
divergence may in part explain the under-utilization of the Ake entitlement.
Not only do the various standards employed by courts deprive counsel of a
clear mechanism for requesting Ake funds, but, in some cases, such as where
an ex parte request is denied, the promise of the Ake opinion is undermined.
Some of this divergence stems from the endless variety of fact patterns
presented to courts.  But at the same time, some of the divergence results from
the fact that the Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari on several Ake-
related issues.58  As a result, courts are enforcing Ake to varying extents and
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certiorari on Ake-related cases and the confusion that has ensued in lower courts).  
59. Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender Act,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1482-83 (2006) (“Many states employ a combination of
these three approaches.  Systems may be organized at the state, county, region, or judicial
district level, and funding can come from a combination of state funds, county funds, user fees,
and court costs.” (citations omitted)); see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 38, at
5 (demonstrating the variety of indigent defense programs among the twenty-two states included
in the report).
60. For a general discussion of class-based injustice in criminal defense, see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 122-30 (2004) (citing a decline in public expenditures per criminal
case over the last half century).  For analysis at the state level, see GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE,
supra note 38, at 9-10, 17-18.  
61. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 342-44 (Md. 2005) (defendant hired private counsel with
money obtained from a personal injury suit settlement, and although defendant was indigent at
the time of his murder trial because he was in jail pending trial, the court still denied him Ake
assistance).  Contra State v. Brown, 2006-NMSC-023, ¶ 26, 134 P.3d 753, 759 (“It appears that
the majority of state courts that have examined this issue have concluded that under the U.S.
Constitution and their respective state statutes, indigent defendants represented by pro bono or
retained counsel are entitled to state funding for various defense costs, including expert witness
fees.”).
62. One capital lawyer with a public defender’s office told me she requests Ake funds in
“every case, all the time.”  E-mail from Kari Converse, supra note 53. 
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-163 (Supp. 2007).
arriving at decisions, in some cases, that do not comport with the Ake Court’s
mandate.
2. Structural Flaws in State Defense Systems
States provide for indigent criminal defendants by employing one of three
approaches or a combination thereof: (1) a public defender’s office; (2)
judicial appointment on a case-by-case basis; and (3) contracts with private
counsel.59  All three of these systems contain flaws that may contribute to the
under-utilization of the Ake entitlement.
To begin, it is a well-documented fact that public defenders are chronically
over-worked and underpaid.60  A heavy case load and a low salary may create
a disincentive for the type of zealous advocacy that would entail seeking Ake
funds for one’s client.  Moreover, public defense systems can hamstring
indigent defendants who are able to secure private counsel and then are denied
Ake funds because they are not clients of the public defender’s office.61  On the
other hand, anecdotal evidence from the capital community indicates that
public defenders may be best suited to make Ake requests because (1) they
routinely do so,62 (2) they are most likely to attend continuing legal education
courses that encourage pursuit of Ake funds where appropriate, and (3) they
may seek funds from the public defender’s office, not a court fund.63  In sum,
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64. Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel: Gideon v. Wainwright at 40, CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6, 8; ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, MUTING GIDEON’S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 11-12 (2000), available at http://www.uta.edu/pols/
moore/indigent/last.pdf (identifying a lawyer’s reputation for “moving cases” and whether the
lawyer has contributed to a judicial campaign as contributing to judicial appointments in
criminal cases); GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 38, at 11-12.  
65. BUTCHER & MOORE, supra note 64, at 17-18 (quoting a defense attorney in Galveston,
Texas, stating that in his county “there is a judge that will not follow Ake v. Oklahoma and its
progeny and makes defense counsel reveal to the state the names of investigators and experts,”
and noting that “some attorneys no longer request support services because they simply assume
they will be denied”).  
66. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 38, at 20-21.  
despite their potentially crushing workloads, public defenders may be best-
suited to pursue necessary Ake funds. 
Contract lawyers and judicially-appointed lawyers, however, are not well-
positioned to aggressively seek Ake funding where it is appropriate given the
structural constraints inherent in those systems.  First, in some jurisdictions
indigent criminal defense work is granted not on the basis of a lawyer’s
experience or work quality, but on the basis of arbitrary factors such as who
is the lowest bidder, which attorney needs the income according to the judge,
and who can move a case along expeditiously.64  Second, lawyers who are
working on an appointment basis may meet judicial resistance whenever they
seek Ake funds and simply stop making the request as a result.65  A bare-bones
capital defense presents many problems, the most important of which is that
it will likely constitute ineffective assistance.  In any event, it is not likely to
include the pursuit of Ake funding, especially when such requests may come
at a reputational cost, as discussed below.  Moreover, lawyers who are granted
defense work on a case-by-case basis have an incentive to dispose of a case
quickly with minimal disruption to the court’s docket if they want to obtain
future work.  In many cases, they must obtain future appointments for their
livelihood.66  
Thus, the structure of state defense systems explains in part why Ake
funding is not as aggressively pursued as it could be.  Public defenders may
have the training and objectivity required for the aggressive pursuit of Ake
funds, but their overwhelming workloads may hamper their ability to pursue
what each client is theoretically entitled to.  Contract and judicially-appointed
lawyers may face similar workload constraints, while also feeling pressured
to keep cases moving.  In sum, structural aspects of indigent defense —
methods for the appointment of counsel, under-funding by state legislatures,
and lack of objectivity — are part of the reason for the gap between Ake in
theory and in practice. 
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67. ROY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL
COURT COMMUNITIES 1-20 (1992).  
68. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 806, 811-12 (2000) (outlining the types of sanctions imposed on
lawyers who violate the local norms, including negative gossip, public chastisement,
withholding or increasing judicial appointments, creating scheduling inconveniences, adverse
rulings on motions, and the withholding of favorable plea-bargaining terms).  
69. FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 67, at 140.
70. Id. 
71. Brown, supra note 68, at 808-10 (noting the same dynamic with respect to jury trial
requests, the rule on ex parte proceedings, and the filing of discovery motions).
3. Lawyering Norms
A third explanation for why Ake is under-utilized lies in the important area
of lawyering norms.  Several pivotal studies have established that in legal
communities across the country, judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
engage in “purposive adaptive behavior” to respond to a myriad of factors
shaping their community, including political events, court policies, and
judicial histories.67  This adaptive behavior may be called norms — “conduct
that is either encouraged by rewards or enforced by sanctions. . . .  [N]orms are
rules, which are violated only at a cost.”68  Sometimes this adaptive
behavior — or the development of norms — within a legal community can be
a good thing.  For example, the presence of repeat players within a legal
community may create incentives for ethical behavior.  As one defense lawyer
recognized, “Trickery and deceit only get you there a few times, and then what
goes around comes around, and you’re through.”69  Another participant in the
study echoed this sentiment: “To operate well around here, you have to
establish a certain integrity or you’re in trouble.”70  From the standpoint of
professional responsibility, the development of lawyering norms that enforce
honesty and fair dealing is unquestionably a good thing.
However, in the context of the Ake issue at hand, sometimes the
development of lawyering norms can have a deleterious effect on indigent
criminal defendants and by extension on our legal system.  For example,
scholars have documented the fact that practice norms develop whereby
constitutional rights are undermined through signaling within a community.
A judge who thinks that defense counsel has requested Ake funding where it
is not appropriate, say in a DUI case, may grant the funds because she feels
legally bound to do so, but the judge may then give a harsher sentence to the
defendant if he loses at trial.  Thus, other defense counsel quickly learn
through this signaling mechanism to reserve Ake requests for more serious
crimes.71
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72. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, Guideline 4.1, at 33.  
Mitigation specialists possess clinical and information-gathering skills and
training that most lawyers simply do not have.  They have the time and the ability
to elicit sensitive, embarrassing and often humiliating evidence (e.g., family
sexual abuse) that the defendant may have never disclosed.  They have the clinical
skills to recognize such things as congenital, mental or neurological conditions,
to understand how these conditions may have affected the defendant’s
development and behavior, and to identify the most appropriate experts to
examine the defendant or testify on his behalf.
XXPerhaps most critically, having a qualified mitigation specialist assigned to
every capital case . . . insures that the presentation to be made at the penalty phase
is integrated into the overall preparation of the case rather than being hurriedly
thrown together by defense counsel still in shock at the guilty verdict.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Natman Schaye & Roseann Schaye-Glos, Mitigation in the
Death Belt — Twelve Steps to Saving Clients’ Lives, CHAMPION, July 2005, at 18-19.
73. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
74. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  
75. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
76. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
This particular example may not be troubling from a normative or fiscal
perspective; jurisdictions, as noted above, are split on how far the right to Ake
funds should extend, and all communities face budget constraints.  However,
in the capital context, expert assistance is always vital because the defendant’s
life is at stake and because a lawyer cannot adequately develop a mitigation
case without expert assistance.72  Thus, lawyering norms and the extent to
which they shape requests for Ake funding deserve heightened scrutiny in the
capital setting. 
 In sum, there are at least three explanations for the under-utilization of the
Ake entitlement: (1) divergence in lower courts’ reading and application of the
Ake mandate; (2) structural flaws in state defense systems; and (3) lawyering
norms that may discourage zealous representation, including the pursuit of Ake
funding.
II. The Revitalization of Ake
Despite the reality that the Ake entitlement has been under-utilized, recent
Supreme Court opinions and ABA pronouncements embraced by the Court
suggest that there is reason to hope that the promise of Ake — meaningful
access to justice — will be realized in the coming years.  In particular, the
cases of Atkins v. Virginia,73 Wiggins v. Smith,74 and Panetti v. Quarterman75
suggest that there is new bite to the Ake mandate.  Each case will be addressed
in turn.
First, in Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
the execution of the mentally retarded.76  Writing for the majority, Justice
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77. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that two state statutes forbidding the execution of the
mentally retarded did not justify an Eighth Amendment prohibition of such executions).  
78. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16 (“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far
more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large
number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.”).
79. Id. at 318-20 (recognizing that the hallmark intellectual deficiencies of mental
retardation undermine the validity of deterrence and retribution as justifications for the death
penalty when the defendant is mentally retarded).  
80. Id. at 321 (noting that with mentally retarded defendants there is a greater likelihood
of false confessions and a reduced ability for the defendant to assist in his defense and/or
presentation of mitigation evidence).  
81. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Death Penalty; Citing ‘National
Consensus,’ Justices Bar Death Penalty for Retarded Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002,
at A1 (noting that fifteen countries in the European Union filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mr.
Atkins and quoting Amnesty International’s position that the decision “provide[s] the U.S.
criminal justice system with a critical tool to uphold human rights standards”). 
82. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (citation omitted).  
Stevens laid out three primary rationales for the Court’s departure from its own
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh:77 (1) legislative trends indicating a new
consensus disapproving of the execution of the mentally retarded;78 (2)
growing doubt among social scientists as to whether the accepted justifications
for execution applied to the mentally retarded;79 and (3) the belief that
“[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.”80
While the capital defense and much of the international community praised
the Atkins decision,81 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent was particularly skeptical in
its prediction of “feigned” Atkins claims:
This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the
others in turning the process of capital trial into a game.  One need
only read the definitions of mental retardation adopted by the
American Association of Mental Retardation and the American
Psychiatric Association . . . to realize that the symptoms of this
condition can readily be feigned.  And whereas the capital
defendant who feigns insanity risks commitment to a mental
institution until he can be cured . . . the capital defendant who
feigns mental retardation risks nothing at all.82
Setting aside the inaccuracies of this ominous prediction (including, for
example, the fact that mental retardation by definition entails an onset before
adulthood and thus would require the feigning defendant to have had amazing
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83. For a general discussion of investigating whether a criminal defendant is mentally
retarded and litigating that defense, see John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles
of Developing and Presenting Evidence of Mental Retardation, CHAMPION, May 2002, at 58;
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/.  
84. See Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2565, 2585 n.125 (2003).
85. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
86. Id. at 514-16.
87. Id. at 518.
88. Id. at 518-19. 
89. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
foresight), there is a kernel of truth in its sentiment.  Post-Atkins, a good
capital defense lawyer has an obligation to investigate whether his client
qualifies for an Atkins claim.  If he does, then death is off the table, and this
fact cannot be lost on defense counsel.83  Moreover, Atkins litigation has
established the need for new kinds of experts.  The average psychologist or
psychiatrist may lack the specialized training required to evaluate mental
retardation, and some post-Atkins legislation recognizes that fact.84  Thus,
Atkins has contributed to the revitalization of Ake.  Atkins gave capital counsel
a new incentive to investigate the mental deficiencies of their clients and thus
a new reason, and perhaps firmer footing on which, to request Ake funding.
Second, the Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Smith has further bolstered an
indigent capital defendant’s claim to expert assistance.85  In that case, Kevin
Wiggins was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of
theft in the State of Maryland.  After a Baltimore County judge found him
guilty on all counts, a jury sentenced him to death in 1989.86  Following a
failed appeal before the Maryland Court of Appeals, Mr. Wiggins sought state
post-conviction relief on the theory that his attorneys — two public
defenders — had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that they failed
to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of his
trial.  The Maryland Court of Appeals once again denied Mr. Wiggins relief.87
In 2001, Mr. Wiggins filed a habeas petition in federal court, again arguing
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The district court granted such relief, and
was promptly overruled by the Fourth Circuit.88  The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to answer the following question: does counsel’s failure to
adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel, even where counsel made the “tactical” decision to not
pursue said mitigation evidence?  Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor
held that Mr. Wiggins’s counsel had provided ineffective assistance.  Applying
the test set out in Strickland v. Washington,89 the Court found that Mr.
Wiggins’s counsel had failed to meet the standards for capital defense
representation required by the Court’s own precedent and by the ABA.
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90. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 516-17.  
92. Id. at 526-27. 
93. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  The Court reiterated the rationale for such
mitigation evidence, noting that Mr. Wiggins had “the kind of troubled history we have declared
relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (citing Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and
character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may be less
Counsel’s decision not to expand their investigation beyond the
[pre-sentence investigation report] and the [Department of Social
Services] records fell short of the professional standards that
prevailed in Maryland in 1989 . . . .  [S]tandard practice in
Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins’ trial included the
preparation of a social history report.  Despite the fact that the
Public Defender’s office made funds available for the retention of
a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to commission such a
report.  Counsel’s conduct similarly fell short of the standards for
capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association
(ABA) — standards to which we long have referred as guides to
determining what is reasonable.  The ABA Guidelines provide that
investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence
to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the
prosecutor.90
Citing evidence that a court-appointed, licensed social worker unearthed
during Mr. Wiggins’s post-conviction claim for relief, the Court noted that had
his counsel pursued a proper mitigation investigation, they would have
discovered relevant and compelling evidence of the hardship that Mr. Wiggins
had endured in his youth.  Such hardship included “severe physical and sexual
abuse . . . at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster
parents,” neglect and starvation, and repeated rapes.91  According to the Court,
counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and then present such evidence
constituted ineffective assistance under Strickland.  Moreover, the Court
rejected any attempts to paint the failure to investigate as “strategic,” calling
this “a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct [rather] than an accurate
description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.”92  Wiggins, then,
fortified the promise of Ake because it set forth the Court’s position on the
absolutely vital need for mitigation evidence in the capital litigation context —
the kind of evidence that can only be obtained and generated with expert
assistance.93  Further, in Wiggins funds were available for defense counsel to
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culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”)).  
94. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517. 
95. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 278, 282
(2003) (“In Wiggins, the Court promoted a longstanding guideline of the ABA — that capital
counsel thoroughly explore the social background of the defendant — to the level of
constitutional mandate.  The Court ruled that the investigation conducted by Wiggins’s counsel
was constitutionally infirm inasmuch as it failed to uncover the ‘sordid’ details of the
defendant’s personal history.  Although the Court did not expressly state that a mitigation
specialist is required to lead this investigation, its logic may strongly support such a
conclusion.”); see also United States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 299 n.7 (2005) (upholding the
determination that denial of mitigation specialist in capital case was not harmless error and
noting Wiggins specifically).
96.  Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
97.  Brief for Petitioner at 7, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
98. Id.
99. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848.  These facts are even more surprising when one considers
Mr. Panetti’s conduct at trial.  He tried to issue subpoenas to Jesus, the Pope and John F.
Kennedy.  See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Consider Impact of Mental Illness on Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at A12.  Moreover, his dialogue with a panel of potential
jurors was virtually incomprehensible.  Instead of asking a question, Mr. Panetti said: “The
death penalty doesn’t scare me, sure but not much.  Be killed, power line, when I was a kid.
I’ve got my Injun beliefs as a shaman.  I sent the buffalo horn to my sister.  Adjustment, Jesus
wrote.”  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 12.
100. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 15.  Because the procedural posture of the case
conduct a mitigation investigation, and yet counsel did not take advantage of
the funds.94
Thus, Ake and Wiggins together stand for the following propositions: (1)
upon a preliminary showing, an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to
expert assistance where such assistance is necessary to marshal an adequate
defense; and (2) at least in the capital context, counsel’s failure to pursue
expert assistance that may generate mitigation evidence constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.95
Third, the recent case of Panetti v. Quarterman not only highlights the need
for expert mental health evaluations in a capital case, but also bolsters a
defendant’s claim to expert funds during state habeas proceedings.96  In 1992,
Scott Louis Panetti shot his parents-in-law while dressed in “camouflage
combat fatigues.”97  “In the decade leading up to the offense, Mr. Panetti was
hospitalized over a dozen times in numerous institutions for schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, psychosis, auditory
hallucinations, and delusions of persecution and grandiosity.”98
Notwithstanding Mr. Panetti’s history of mental illness, the state court deemed
him competent to stand trial and allowed Mr. Panetti to represent himself.99
On September 22, 1995, after a one-day sentencing proceeding, a jury
sentenced him to death.100
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was central to the Court’s analysis, it is worth noting the somewhat convoluted appellate history
of the case.  See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849-52. 
101. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2859 (alteration in original).
102. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Panetti v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
103. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860.
104. Id. at 2852 (citation omitted).
105. It is worth noting that in the more than twenty years since the Supreme Court first
announced the ban on executing the insane, the Fifth Circuit, employing its pre-Panetti
standard, failed to find a single inmate incompetent to execute.  See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 26, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
106. In 2004, after unsuccessfully appealing his conviction and sentence in both state and
federal court, Mr. Panetti raised for the first time in federal court the claim that under Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), he was incompetent to be executed.  Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at
2850.  At that point, the federal district court stayed Mr. Panetti’s execution to allow the state
court an opportunity to consider Mr. Panetti’s mental state.  Id.  During this state habeas
proceeding, Mr. Panetti repeatedly requested the funds to hire a mental health expert.  Id. at
2850-51.  The state court never ruled on the motion for expert fees, and instead appointed two
experts on its own, both of whom declared Mr. Panetti competent to be executed and alleged
that “[Mr. Panetti’s] uncooperative and bizarre behavior was due to calculated design.”  Id. at
2851.  Having had his Ford claim rejected in state court, Mr. Panetti returned to federal court,
where he was granted a stay of execution, counsel, and funds.  Id.
The precise question before the Court in Panetti was “whether the Eighth
Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness deprives
him of ‘the mental capacity to understand that [he] is being executed as a
punishment for a crime.’”101  The Fifth Circuit had upheld Mr. Panetti’s death
sentence on the grounds that “Panetti knows: (1) that he committed two
murders; (2) that he will be executed; and (3) that the reason the state has
given for that execution is his commission of those murders.”102
While declining to offer a revised standard of its own, the Court rejected the
standard employed by the Fifth Circuit and held that “the Court of Appeals’
standard is too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the
Eighth Amendment.”103  This is an important holding in its own right: a
defendant’s bare factual awareness of his “impending execution and the factual
predicate for the execution” no longer suffices.104  Thus, the Court’s rejection
of the Fifth Circuit’s simplistic formulation should improve competency-to-be-
executed proceedings for death row inmates in that jurisdiction.105
While the Supreme Court technically did not consider the funding issue in
Panetti,106 the Court’s decision in the case has enhanced a defendant’s right to
Ake funding in two respects.  First, the case almost certainly increased public
awareness of mental illness among prisoners.  Mr. Panetti is not unique among
inmates in his mental illness.  In 2006, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported
that fifty-six percent of state prisoners and forty-five percent of federal
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107. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
108. Brief for Respondent at 40, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-
6407) (citing Nancy S. Horton, Restoration of Competency for Execution: Furiosus Solo Furore
Punitur, 44 SW. L.J. 1191, 1204 (1990)).
109. The briefs filed in Mr. Panetti’s case are a valuable resource for capital defenders
whose clients are mentally ill or who may have a Ford claim.  See Brief for Amici Curiae
American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127
S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407); Brief Amicus Curiae of The American Bar Association in
Support of Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407); see also
Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate an
Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2006).
110. See Mark Hansen, Mentally Ill Death Row Inmate Gets Another Chance, ABA
JOURNAL E-REPORT, July 6, 2007, available at Westlaw, 6 No. 27 ABAJEREP 3. 
111. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
prisoners had mental health problems.107  Statistics among death-row
populations are even more disturbing.  “Although estimates vary, some sources
indicate that as many as 70 percent of death-row inmates suffer from some
form of schizophrenia or psychosis.”108  Given the prevalence of mental illness
among inmates, the Panetti decision is an important reminder to defense
counsel to investigate these health concerns adequately and in a timely
manner.109  At the same time, the opinion suggests that expertise will be
required to help lower courts distinguish Panetti-type psychosis from the more
common forms of mental illness.110
Second, the majority in Panetti suggested through its logic and reasoning
that a defendant like Panetti is entitled to Ake funding for a mental health
evaluation during a state habeas proceeding.  The majority found that Mr.
Panetti had made a threshold showing of insanity and was thereafter entitled
to “a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with fundamental fairness.”111  After enumerating
several procedural transgressions at the trial court level, the majority noted the
central flaw in the state court habeas proceeding:
[T]he order issued by the state court implied that its determination
of petitioner’s competency was made solely on the basis of the
examinations performed by the psychiatrists it had appointed —
precisely the sort of adjudication Justice Powell warned [in Ford]
would “invit[e] arbitrariness and error.”  
The state court made an additional error, one that Ford makes
clear is impermissible under the Constitution: It failed to provide
[Mr. Panetti] with an adequate opportunity to submit expert
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112. Id. at 2857 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 2858. 
114. One may argue that this reads too much into the majority’s position, for as Justice
Thomas points out, the Court has “never recognized a constitutional right to state funding for
counsel in state habeas proceedings — much less for experts — and Texas law grants no such
right in Ford proceedings.”  Id. at 2872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  However, many states do
recognize a right to state-funded counsel during state habeas proceedings on either an absolute
or conditional basis.  See Sarah L. Thomas, A Legislative Challenge: A Proposed Model Statute
to Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings for Indigent
Petitioners, 54 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1152-58 (2005).  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s rejection
of a constitutional right to counsel during state habeas proceedings has invited much criticism
and has been deemed anachronistic by some.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Note, Murray v.
Giarratano: A Remedy Reduced to a Meaningless Ritual, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 765, 788-804
(1990); see also Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State
Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079 (2006).  
115. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2871 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
116. Id. 
evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed
experts.112
Admittedly, the Court did not state explicitly that Mr. Panetti had a right to
expert services at Texas’s expense.  But, if he was entitled, as the Court says,
to “an opportunity to submit psychiatric evidence as a counter-weight to the
report filed by court-appointed experts,”113 the logic of the opinion suggests
that Mr. Panetti was, in fact, entitled to those services at the state’s expense.
If he were not, the Court’s insistence upon his opportunity to challenge the
report of court-appointed experts would ring hollow: its logic would rely on
the assumption that Panetti, and others similarly situated, would be able to
retain these services with his own funds or on a pro bono basis — clearly not
reasonable assumptions in the majority of cases.114
Justice Thomas’s dissent provides further evidence that what was really at
stake for Mr. Panetti during his 2004 Texas state habeas proceeding was not
simply an opportunity to challenge the expert testimony of the court-appointed
experts, but rather the resources to secure experts who could do so.  Once the
state court announced its determination that Mr. Panetti was competent to be
executed, counsel for Mr. Panetti renewed his motion seeking state funds for
a mental health expert.115  As Justice Thomas states: “[t]he record demonstrates
that what Panetti actually sought was not the opportunity to submit additional
evidence — because, at that time, he had no further evidence to submit — but
state funding for his pursuit of more evidence.”116  While the dissent rejects the
notion that Mr. Panetti had a right to such state funds, its analysis lays bare the
fact that without such expert funds Mr. Panetti would not have been able to
avail himself of an “opportunity” to challenge the determination by the court-
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117. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-50 (6th ed.
2003) (adopting the same approach to model of criminal behavior and optimal criminal
sanctions).  
118. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROJECT, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, WHITE PAPER: THE
HIGH COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a648
52566d6000daa79/9706e0aac59259be85256b740055872c/$FILE/DP_WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Aug. 19, 2007); see also Richard Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say
About the High Costs of the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 401, 401-10 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997).
119. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS & PEW FORUM ON RELIGION
AND PUBLIC LIFE, STRONG SUPPORT FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH: ABORTION AND RIGHTS OF
TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES 12 (2005), available at http://pewforum.org/publications/
surveys/social-issues-05.pdf (noting that 68% — or two-thirds of Americans — support the
death penalty); see also Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Death Penalty,
appointed experts.  Thus, while the majority does not explicitly hold that
indigent defendants have a right to state-funded expert services during a state
habeas proceeding, such a conclusion logically flows from the Court’s opinion.
The ABA’s Guidelines for capital defense coupled with recent Supreme
Court case law indicate a trend: Ake is in the process of being revitalized.  The
next section of this article examines what impact this trend will likely have on
capital-sentencing states. 
III. Impact Analysis
Having defined the theoretical rights available under Ake and having
demonstrated that these rights have been revitalized in recent years, analysis
shifts to the impact of this revitalization trend on capital-sentencing states.
This article contends that if the goals of Ake were fully realized, capital states
will have no choice but to alter their behavior with respect to pursuing the
death penalty.
Assuming the state is a rational actor, it will pursue a given punishment —
here, the death penalty — based on a cost-benefit analysis.  The state will ask
whether it can expect to obtain a marginal benefit from the pursuit of each
death penalty greater than its marginal cost.  If marginal cost exceeds marginal
benefit, theoretically, the state will not pursue the death penalty.117
As a preliminary matter, one may ask, with respect to the death penalty,
whether in fact states are behaving as rational actors.  According to some
studies, the costs of appellate litigation necessary to sustain capital sentencing
far exceed the costs a state would incur if instead it imposed a sentence of life-
without-parole.118  Assuming that these studies accurately assess the costs of
imprisonment and litigation, states’ decisions to pursue capital punishment
may be explained by the fact that a majority of Americans — though a
dwindling majority — continue to support the death penalty.119  This does not
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http://pewforum.org/ death-penalty/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (noting that in 1999 74% of
Americans supported the death penalty for those convicted of murder); Gallup Poll, Death
Penalty, http://www. galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1606 (last visited Aug. 19, 2007)
(demonstrating that when given a choice between the death penalty and life imprisonment,
Americans are evenly divided as to which is the better penalty for murder). 
120. See Stephen Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment: The Sacrifice of Fairness for
Executions, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 117, 117-22 (James R.
Acker et al. eds., 1998).  The issue of why states persist in pursuing the death penalty despite
its significant, rising costs is a complex one that the author intends to pursue in a subsequent
article.  It is worth noting, though, that this issue is already generating political debate in some
states, as discussed infra, Part III.B.  In addition, some scholars have suggested that the death
penalty serves a critical social function, and if so, this may partly explain why district attorneys
continue to pursue the death penalty, even when it is expensive to do so.  See Donald L.
Beschle, Why Do People Support Capital Punishment?  The Death Penalty as Community
Ritual, 33 CONN. L. REV. 765 (2001).  Finally, as Professor Liebman explains, incentives within
the criminal justice system lead to the “overproduction of death sentences.”  James S. Liebman,
The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2032-33 (2000) (“With little
resistance from defense lawyers at trial, and with the unwitting connivance of the anti-death
penalty bar thereafter, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries operate with strong incentives to
generate as many death sentences as they can — reaping robust psychic, political and
professional rewards — while displacing the costs of their many consequent mistakes onto
capital prisoners, post-trial review courts, victims, and the public.” (footnote omitted)). 
necessarily mean that states are behaving irrationally, but rather that there are
“soft” variables, such as political considerations, that are not easily captured
in a cost-benefit analysis.120
Even if some states would initially pursue the death penalty where costs
exceeded benefits, there must be some point at which excessive costs become
prohibitive either because the legislature will not allocate the funds or because
taxpayers refuse to support such a pursuit.  This article proceeds on the
assumption that states do act rationally in criminal enforcement decisions, or
at least that they can be persuaded to do so at some point in the cost-benefit
analysis.  As discussed below, recent developments in states like New York
and New Jersey demonstrate that this assumption is reasonable.  Accordingly,
if the mandate of Ake were fully realized, states should respond in one of two
ways.  First, some states may dramatically improve the quality of capital
litigation for indigent defendants.  Second, and this possibility is not mutually
exclusive of the first, some capital states will likely reduce the number of
capital sentences pursued or de facto eliminate the use of capital punishment
as a matter of fiscal necessity.  Either of these outcomes is unequivocally good
whether or not one believes that states should employ the death penalty, as
argued below.
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121. At a bare minimum, this would mean providing each capital defendant with the capital
defense team outlined by the ABA Guidelines.  See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, Guidelines
4.1 & 10.4. 
122. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3.
123. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 38, at 36.
124. Id.  
A. Improved Quality of Capital Litigation
It is hard to imagine that if the full implications of Ake were realized, any
state could continue pursuing the same number of capital cases that it currently
does.  It is possible that states where the sentence is already very rare could do
so, but even in those states, presumably a significant increase in the costs of
capital litigation would induce a change in the state’s behavior.  In fact, the
states that are already using the death penalty very infrequently may be among
the first to abandon it.  The state may recognize that the sentence is already
barely in use and then have to ask whether the state can justify it at all given
its new Ake-inclusive costs. 
Even if there were some states that could maintain their rate of capital
sentencing undeterred by the costs of fully implementing Ake, the regime
would not be unchanged.  Instead, each capital defendant would receive a
fully-litigated, fair trial, consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the ABA
Guidelines.121  Indigent criminal defense counsel would provide effective
assistance pursuant to Strickland and Wiggins.  More specifically, pursuant to
the ABA Guidelines, capital defense lawyers would be more appropriately
prepared for the task of capital litigation: they would have adequate support
services to form a capital defense team; they would have the funds to
adequately investigate their clients’ relevant social, personal and legal
histories; and their workload would recognize the exceptional level of
performance required in a capital case.122
There are some states that offer a benchmark for this type of capital
litigation.  For example, the ABA points to Maryland’s Office of the Public
Defender as a model of oversight and quality assurance, noting that the Office
has recently established a new forensics division and maintains a special
division to handle death penalty cases.123  Similarly, the ABA reports that the
New Mexico Public Defender Department provides its counsel with updated
technology and appropriate support services, including paralegals,
investigators, social workers and administrative staff.124  Thus, in some states,
the revitalization of Ake’s mandate may result in improved quality of capital
litigation.
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125. New York v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
126. Id. at 356.  
127. Id. at 357. 
128. Id. at 358. 
129. Id. at 359. 
130. Id. at 367 (“We cannot, however, ourselves craft a new instruction, because to do so
would usurp legislative prerogative.  We have the power to eliminate an unconstitutional
sentencing procedure, but we do not have the power to fill the void with a different procedure,
particularly one that potentially imposes a greater sentence than the possible deadlock sentence
B. Reduction or Elimination of Capital Punishment
In other capital-sentencing states, however, affording indigent defendants
the full array of expert assistance will be cost-prohibitive.  In these states, there
will likely be a significant reduction in the use of capital punishment either
because prosecutors seek the punishment more selectively or because the
punishment is eliminated de facto.  New York and New Jersey are good case
studies for these propositions.
In 2004, the Court of Appeals of New York declared the state’s death
penalty statute unconstitutional.125  The statute contained a “deadlock” jury
instruction under which 
the court instructed the jurors on their duty to decide whether
defendant should be sentenced to death or to life without parole.
Either choice had to be unanimous.  The court further instructed the
jurors, as required by statute, that if they failed to agree, the court
would sentence defendant to life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after serving a minimum of [twenty] to [twenty-five]
years.126
The LaValle court held that this aspect of the statute violated the state
constitution because it was coercive in nature, noting that “[n]o other death
penalty scheme in the country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they
cannot unanimously agree between two choices, the judge will sentence
defendant to a third, more lenient, choice.”127  Worried that jurors would fear
a defendant’s early release from prison, the court posited, jurors may feel
pressure to vote for a death sentence where they otherwise would not have
done so.128  This risk, according to the court, rendered the statute conducive to
an “arbitrary and unreliable” sentence, and therefore it violated the state
constitution.129
According to the Court of Appeals, the unconstitutional portion of the death
penalty statute was not severable, and it was the job of the State Assembly to
correct the statute and bring it into line with the New York State
Constitution.130  Capital defenders in New York fully expected the legislature
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that has been prescribed.”).
131. I am greatly indebted to Russell Stetler, former Director of Investigation and Mitigation
at the New York Capital Defender Office (1995-2005), for sharing his experience of this
judicial and legislative process.  
132. The Death Penalty in New York: To Examine the Future of Capital Punishment in New
York State Before the Assem. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assem. Standing Comm. on Judiciary,
& Assem. Standing Comm. on Correction, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. 9 (N.Y. 2004) (statement of
Assemblyman Lentol), available at http://purl.org/net/nysl/nysdocs/57668812.
133. Id. at 22-23 (citing 2003 study by the State of Kansas that found the median cost of
capital case was $1.26 million and 1993 Duke University study that concluded “for each person
executed in North Carolina, the state paid over $2 million more than it would have cost to
imprison him for life”).
to do just this, and they proceeded on that assumption, continuing to prepare
the defenses for their pending capital cases.  To their surprise, however, when
the State Assembly took up the issue of the now-unconstitutional death penalty
statute, instead of directly addressing the unconstitutional jury instruction
identified by the Court of Appeals, the Assembly asked a much larger
question: Should the State of New York have a death penalty statute?131
Testimony from Assembly sessions on that question reveals that, consistent
with the assertions in this article, the state’s ongoing ability to finance capital
litigation was a central issue in the Assembly’s inquiry.  On December 15,
2004, Assemblyman Joseph Lentol opened the State Assembly session with
the following statement:
New York’s death penalty law was in effect for slightly less than
nine years before it was struck down this June.  In that time, it is
estimated that the state and local governments have spent
approximately $170 million administering the statute.  Seven
persons have been sentenced to death, but no one has been
executed.  Of the seven imposed death sentences, the first four to
reach the Court of Appeals were struck down on various
grounds.132
And while the state’s public hearing on the ongoing appropriateness of the
death penalty addressed a range of issues, including racial and economic
discrimination in the administration of the sentence and religious and cultural
arguments against the death penalty, money was an issue.  New York City
District Attorney Robert Morgenthau testified that the state should no longer
permit the pursuit of the death penalty.  Among other things, he cited several
studies that revealed the prohibitive costs of capital punishment.133  He noted
that since the State of New York had reinstated the death penalty, it paid $68.4
million to capital defense lawyers alone, and that in one case, the state incurred
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134. Id. at 23.
135. As this article goes to print, the New York State Senate has passed legislation to re-
instate the death penalty for those convicted of killing a police officer.  See Senate Passes Death
Penalty Legislation, US STATE NEWS, July 16, 2007, available at Westlaw, 2007 WLNR
13596347.  The bill has been sent to the Assembly.  Id.
136. MARY E. FORSBERG, N.J. POLICY PERSPECTIVE, MONEY FOR NOTHING?: THE FINANCIAL
COST OF NEW JERSEY’S DEATH PENALTY 2-16 (2005), available at http://www.njpp.org/dl.php?
file=rpt_moneyfornothing.pdf. 
137. Laura Mansnerus, Panel Seeks End to Death Penalty for New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2007, at A1; see also N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY
STUDY COMMISSION REPORT (2007) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT], available at http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf.
138. Ronald Smothers, New Jersey Moves Closer to Abolishing Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2007, at B4. 
139. See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 137, at 33 (“[C]onsistent with the Commissions’
finding, recent studies in states such as Tennessee, Kansas, Indiana, Florida and North Carolina
have all concluded that the costs associated with death penalty cases are significantly higher
than those associated with life without parole cases.”); see also Eric M. Freedman, Add
Resources and Apply Them Systematically: Government’s Responsibilities Under the Revised
ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1097, 1098 n.3 (2003).
140. In order for this contention to hold true, the costs of implementing Ake (including all
relevant forms of expert assistance) must comprise a significant portion of capital litigation
costs.  It is difficult to say precisely what portion of the price tag for a capital case can be
attributed to Ake-related costs, such as expert report fees, investigative fees, and penalty-phase
expert testimony.  However, the costs are not insignificant.  The New Jersey Report specifically
$1.7 million in defense expenses.134  Capital punishment in New York has been
eliminated de jure, not de facto, but it is clear from the Assembly testimony
that legislators were persuaded by the economic demands of capital
punishment upon an already burdened system.135
New Jersey provides another example of a state where fiscal pressures have
dampened support for the death penalty.  A 2005 report by the New Jersey
Policy Perspective demonstrated that New Jersey has spent more than $253
million on a death penalty system that has executed no one.136  And more
recently, a legislative commission recommended that New Jersey abolish its
death penalty, in part due to the high costs associated with capital punishment
as compared to a life without parole sentence.137  In May 2007, in response to
this report, a state senate committee passed a bill that would replace the state’s
death penalty with a life without parole sentence.138
The case studies of New York and New Jersey support two contentions: (1)
many states are already feeling fiscal pressure from capital litigation,139 and (2)
if they were asked to absorb more litigation costs — i.e. if the Ake mandate
were fully realized — additional states would likely follow the path of New
York and New Jersey, allowing the state’s death penalty to wither on the
vine.140
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noted the costs of pretrial preparation and investigation, the penalty phase trial, and the
mitigation investigation as driving the costs of capital litigation.  See NEW JERSEY REPORT,
supra note 137, at 31-32.  Moreover, expert testimony on this question indicates that the average
cost of a mitigation investigation alone is between $20,000 and $100,000, while in California
it may cost up to $150,000.  State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 59 (Ariz. 2001).  This cost, coupled
with any mental health or forensic expert assistance, could be a significant portion of capital
defense costs.
141. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2007), available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf. 
142. Id. at 3.
143. I appreciate the insights of Richard Dieter, Executive Director of the Death Penalty
Information Center, for his thoughts on this trend.  For a general discussion of this downward
trend, see generally Neil Lewis, Death Sentences Decline and Experts Offer Reasons, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A28 (citing the “sharp increase in using specialists to develop
arguments for mitigation”); see also Robert Tanner, U.S. Death Sentences Drop to 30-Year
Low, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/wireStory?
id=2771437 (citing the “reluctance among some authorities to pursue the death penalty because
of the high costs of prosecuting a capital case”).  
In addition to these two specific examples, there has been a general
nationwide decline in the number of executions and in the number of death
sentences handed down by juries.  In 1999, there were ninety-eight executions
in the United States, while in 2006 there were only fifty-three.141  The number
of death sentences has also dropped significantly since 1999.  There were 277
death sentences in 1999 and only 128 in 2005.142  This decline can be
attributed to a number of interrelated factors: exonerations making headlines,
state-wide moratoriums declared in recent years, and perhaps a resultant
increase in juries’ reluctance to sentence a person to death.  But cost, too, is a
factor.143
Thus, if Ake were implemented fully, the costs of pursuing the death penalty
would rise even more for states, and the trend of a decline in death sentences
would likely continue at a greater pace.  Throughout this article, it has been
argued that improved quality of capital litigation and/or a reduction in the
number of capital cases pursued are laudable outcomes whether one is a
proponent of the death penalty or not.  A defense of that proposition is in
order.
First, for those who see no constitutional or moral impediment to the use of
capital punishment, the goal of improving the quality of capital litigation
should be an easy sell.  One does not have to be a capital punishment
abolitionist to value due process, equal protection, and judicial accuracy, all
of which would be protected by increased expert assistance for indigent capital
defendants.  Moreover, the potential reduction in the use of capital punishment
dovetails with the former point: the fewer capital cases a state pursues, the
more resources it can afford to devote to those it does pursue.  And finally, the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/2
2007] THE REVITALIZATION OF AKE 311
144. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (“A capital sentencing scheme must, in
short, provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“[W]here discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”).
145. DeGarmo v. Texas, 474 U.S. 973, 973 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg,
428 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
146. The tactical approach is based on a tax analogy: if a member of society engages in some
form of noxious behavior, it behooves the state to tax that behavior, thereby compelling the
individual person or entity to fully internalize the costs of their offending act.  Similarly, if a
state wants to pursue the death penalty it should be compelled to fully internalize the costs of
doing so in a competent and non-discriminatory manner.  See Freedman, supra note 139, at
notion of district attorneys scrupulously determining which cases are death-
worthy is consistent with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it stands today.
This jurisprudence tolerates the use of capital punishment only for a subset of
violent crimes and only when it is applied in a non-arbitrary manner.144
Liberalizing capital defendants’ access to the full array of expert assistance to
which they are theoretically entitled would serve that purpose.  Thus, the
aspiration of affording capital defendants the full panoply of expert assistance
to which they are legally entitled should be a welcome change even for those
who advocate the use of capital punishment.
At the same time, it is obvious that the two possible outcomes described in
this article hold great appeal for those who believe, as this author does, that the
death penalty is a punishment unfit for a society as morally advanced and
institutionally democratic as our own.  Justice Brennan expressed this view in
1985, stating: 
I do not believe that the unconstitutionality of capital punishment
depends upon the procedures under which the penalty is inflicted.
In my view, the constitutional infirmity in the punishment of death
is that “it treats ‘members of the human race as nonhumans, as
objects to be toyed with and discarded’ and is thus ‘inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of the [Eighth Amendment] that even
the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common
human dignity.’”145
If one holds this view — that capital punishment offends our sense of human
dignity — then the aggressive pursuit of Ake funds is simply another tool with
which to work toward the elimination of capital sentencing.  And to the extent
that it is not already doing so, the capital defense community should capitalize
upon the legal entitlements described herein as part of a wider tactical
approach to eradicating capital punishment in this country.146
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1102 (“[T]he constitutional duty to provide capital defendants with an effective defense belongs
to the states [and] jurisdictions that wish to have a death penalty must bear the full costs of
providing such a defense.”).  
147. See Brown, supra note 68, at 829 (“Ake, fully implemented by zealous defense counsel,
would therefore effectively give indigent defendants more justice — a larger entitlement that
improves outcome accuracy — than working people would get.  This is unfair.”).
148. Related questions include: (1) How do states measure indigence and are judges
exercising standardless discretion in that determination? and (2) Does the disadvantaged
middle-class defendant even exist in the real world?  See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3,
Guideline 4.1, at 34 (“Finally, in the relatively rare case in which a capital defendant retains
counsel, jurisdictions must ensure that the defendant has access to necessary investigative and
expert services if the defendant cannot afford them.  Inability to afford counsel necessarily
means that a defendant is unable to afford essential supporting services, such as investigative
assistance and expert witnesses.  The converse does not follow, however.  Just because a
defendant is able to afford retained counsel does not mean that sufficient finances are available
for essential services.  Supporting services should be made available to the clients of retained
counsel who are unable to afford the required assistance.  Of course, the same observations
apply where counsel is serving pro bono or, although originally retained, has simply run out of
However, one theoretical concern should be noted: the idea that if Ake
funding were in fact “fully implemented by zealous defense counsel,” any due
process gains would be eclipsed by a competing concern for the quality of
criminal defense available to working-class defendants.147  If Ake were fully
realized, one can imagine a world in which wealthy litigants would hire any
expert they deemed necessary, and indigent defendants would effectively do
the same under Ake.  Working-class defendants would be left with the weakest
defense.  Such an outcome would be unfair.
There are three responses to this legitimate concern.  First, the focus of this
article is Ake funding in the capital defense context, not in all criminal cases.
One can rationally assume that the working-class capital defendant would do
everything in his power to secure counsel and expert assistance — reach out
to family members, take out secondary mortgages, and so forth.  The truly
indigent defendant can do none of the above.  This response may be
inadequate, though, where the threshold for indigency is high enough that even
some “working-class” capital defendants are left without adequate expert
assistance.
And yet, state legislatures attempting to adequately fund indigent defense
and the defense community’s agenda must start somewhere, and hopefully
build from there.  Yes, the working-class and the “borderline” indigent, if you
will, also are entitled to a fair trial with the necessary expert assistance.  But
the primary aim of this article is to envision a world in which Ake were fully
realized for indigent capital defendants, those least in a position to marshal any
resources for their own defense.  This is not to minimize the needs of middle
or working-class capital defendants, but that is a separate subject altogether.148
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money.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted)).
149.  It is noteworthy that the ABA’s report on indigent defense is entitled Gideon’s Broken
Promise (emphasis to title added).  See also Bright, supra note 64, at 6 (“No constitutional right
is celebrated so much in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel. . . .
For far too many people accused of crimes, the right to counsel is meaningless and
unenforceable.”).
150. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (2004) (arguing that there should be a
“more explicit acknowledgment of this permanent process of managing scarce resources” and
“that trial lawyers and, to a lesser extent, trial judges should consciously devise policies for
implementing choices about entitlement allocation,” as well as suggesting that factual innocence
should be the “predominant concern of criminal procedure over other competing goals, such as
regulation of police conduct”).
Finally, if the outcomes described in this article were to ensue from the full
utilization of Ake, then working-class and even wealthy capital defendants
would stand to gain as well.  If capital punishment is de facto eliminated or
pursued at a much lower rate, capital defendants of all classes will benefit.
Conclusion
It has been argued that recent ABA developments and Supreme Court
decisions are reinvigorating the Ake doctrine.  Two issues must be addressed
by way of conclusion.  First, this analysis of Ake is not intended to shift all of
the weight of ineffective assistance of counsel — an ongoing, serious
problem — onto the issue of expert fees.  A more fully-utilized Ake, or, for
that matter, a completely realized Ake, is not a sufficient, but rather a
necessary, condition for effective assistance of counsel.  That said, it is hoped
that this analysis offers a fresh perspective on the broader Sixth Amendment
concerns regarding indigent defense.  And, moreover, it offers defense counsel
a tactical way in which to approach a plea negotiation process, as already
noted.
Second, there is the question whether Ake can be fully realized.  That is,
other constitutional entitlements have gone under-utilized for years,
notwithstanding case law to the contrary; why should Ake be any different?
For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been in place for over
forty years, and even today there continues to be an enormous gap between the
promise and reality of Gideon.149  As Professor Brown explains, “Funding
decisions, in effect, delegate to trial attorneys and judges the job of rationing
rights.  That is, these actors have the job of choosing which of the formal
entitlements courts have created will see practical implementation, and in
which cases.”150  Given this reality and the fact that the normative and
structural aspects of indigent capital defense litigation identified in this article
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are not likely to change overnight, if ever, why express optimism about the
revitalization of Ake?
Part of this optimism comes from the political and judicial climate today.
As discussed in Part III of this article, there is a significant downward trend in
the use of capital punishment altogether, some of which can be attributed to
cost-benefit analysis at the state level.  Conditions may be ripe for a serious
analysis of what the Ake doctrine requires fiscally, especially in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part II of this article.
Second, while the impediments to Ake, discussed in Part I of this article,
persist today, there may be defense counsel who can operate outside of these
normative and structural constraints.  This author worked as part of a pro bono
death penalty defense team in Oklahoma, which aggressively sought Ake
funding.  We argued that if we were not representing our client pro bono, the
State would be required to provide counsel for our indigent client through its
state defense system.  We further argued that the State was not entitled to a
windfall from our legal representation, and that the State should still have to
provide the expert assistance critical to a capital defense and required by the
Constitution under Ake.  Whether the State or the local court fund picked up
the tab was inconsequential to our client’s case, but one way or another, our
client was entitled to state funding for at least some of his expert assistance.
These funding requests were instrumental in achieving a life without parole
settlement for our client.
This experience suggests that pro bono counsel are well suited to
aggressively pursue the Ake funding to which their clients are entitled.  Pro
bono counsel are less likely to have the concerns of reputation and future
collegiality identified in Part I of this article, particularly if they are from a
different geographic area from their client.  Not only can these counsel pursue
Ake funding without fear of reprisal, but also, because pro bono counsel
operate outside of any state defense system, they are able to make the case that
they are saving the state money by providing legal services.  Providing Ake
funds is a relatively minimal burden on the state — that is, compared to what
the state would have to pay for lawyer’s fees as well.
Now, the majority of capital defendants do not have the luxury of being
represented by a team of private lawyers with ample money in their firm’s
coffers and little to lose in terms of reputation.  The question then becomes,
who can replicate the sense of independence that pro bono counsel enjoy?  A
few actors within the defense system are good candidates.
Public defenders are better suited than court-appointed or contract defense
counsel.  As noted in Part I of this article, public defenders are usually
interacting with superiors in their own offices, rather than seeking court funds
for Ake expert assistance.  Moreover, to the extent that public defenders
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already feel marginalized in small legal communities, they stand to lose the
least by aggressively pursuing Ake funds.151
Established, senior counsel within a legal community are also better
positioned to enjoy a sense of independence.  As mentioned in Part I, the
empirical evidence suggests that credibility within a legal community is
critical to a lawyer’s success before a judge.  One would imagine that the more
senior lawyers within a community — those who have already established
themselves among their colleagues and before their judges — would be best
suited to ask for Ake funding, even when a more junior lawyer, an entity
unknown to the community, would not be well-served by doing so.  Thus,
some defense lawyers may overcome the normative and structural
impediments to the goals of Ake, making a fully-implemented Ake more
attainable.
There also may be a more radical way to avoid the current regime of rights-
rationing that flows from chronically under-funded indigent defense systems.
A recent note in the Harvard Law Review suggests that state courts could play
a much more active role in requiring adequate funding for indigent defense. 
One way in which courts have justified ordering legislatures to
expend funds is by asserting that the provision of indigent defense,
and therefore the compensation of attorneys providing that service,
is a judicial function; it then follows that by underfunding the
indigent defense, the legislature infringes upon the judiciary’s
powers, which flips the separation of powers argument entirely.152
Some state court judges have already demonstrated a willingness to make such
demands of state legislatures,153 and to the extent that there has been a recent
revitalization of the Ake mandate as argued herein, they should be better armed
to do so going forward.
In sum, Ake and its progeny promised a great deal: access to expert services
for indigent criminal defendants where such assistance was necessary to the
mounting of an adequate defense.  This article outlines some of the reasons
why the promise of Ake is under-utilized in practice, and argues that recent
ABA and Supreme Court developments have given new bite to the Ake
doctrine.  Finally, it is hypothesized that the logical implications of a
revitalized Ake include improved quality of capital litigation and/or a reduction
in the incidence of capital prosecution.  It has been suggested that both
outcomes are desirable whether or not one is a death-penalty abolitionist.  One
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to correspond to trial court practice.  In fact, trial judges and litigants have crafted more
decentralized and indirect forms of intervention that rely on stakeholder negotiation, rolling-rule
regimes, and transparency. . . .  [E]arly returns on some efforts give reason for optimism.”).
area that requires further exploration is what role a structural injunction may
play in closing the gap between Ake in theory and Ake in practice, particularly
in areas where Ake denials are consistent and egregious.154
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